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Legal Support in War: The Role of Military Lawyers
Rear Admiral Michael F. Lohr* and Commander Steve Gallotta**
When war was fought with
War has existed since time immemorial ....
stones and clubs, few rules were necessary and, of course, none existed.
Nevertheless, the law of war is probably the oldest facet of international
law ....

1

Today, of course, we are beyond stones and clubs. To impose humanity
into the conduct of war, the international community has slowly but inexorably
evolved a code for warfighting.
Earlier advancements in mitigating the effects of war have moved forward
to where, today, we have a full, and growing, body of law known as the law of
war ("LOW") or the law of armed conflict ("LOAC").2 The purpose of the
LOW is to make possible the successful accomplishment of the military mission
while limiting the effects of war by protecting both combatants and
noncombatants from unnecessary suffering, safeguarding the fundamental
human rights of those who fall into the hands of the enemy, and facilitating the
restoration of peace.

I
2

Rear Admiral Lohr is The Judge Advocate General of the Navy. During the Kosovo conflict
then-Captain Lohr served as Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rear
Admiral Lohr wishes to acknowledge the significant contributions of Commander Steve
Gallotta in this article. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or of the US
Government.
Commander Gallotta is the Fleet Judge Advocate, Commander, US Second Fleet.
Howard S. Levie, The Laws of War and Neuralioy, in John Norton Moore, Frederick S. Tipson,
and Robert F. Turner, eds, NationalSecuriyLaw 307 (Carolina 1990).
Law of war: "That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities.
Also called the law of armed conflict." The law of war encompasses all international law for
the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including
treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable
customary international law. See Department of Defense Diclionary of Military and Associated Terms,
Joint Publication 1-02, 301 (Apr 12, 2001), available online at <http://www.dtic.mil
/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html> (visited Sept 16, 2003).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay discusses the role of military lawyers (judge advocates) in war. It
will explore the role of military lawyers at all levels of command3 and will center

on the development of the "operational lawyer." Operational law ("OPLAW")
advisors are distinguished by their practice: they support the commander's
conduct of warfare.4
The discussion about the role of military lawyers in war starts with the
LOW and the commitment of the United States to conduct military operations

within the bounds of this body of international law. After decades of steady
development in humanitarian law, the war crimes tribunals following World War
II sped the development of the LOW, providing for the first time an accepted
body of precedent associated with the enforcement of the LOW.
Efforts to enforce the LOW have been complemented by international
instruments that have served to contain the cruelty of war. From the Lieber
Code of the US Civil War to the 1907 Hague Resolutions and 1949 Geneva
Conventions, and on to international efforts to outlaw chemical and biological
weapons, numerous international declarations and conventions have had the
purpose of limiting or otherwise shaping the conduct of warfare.5 These norms
have generally centered on the proposition that "[t]he right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."6 From this proposition

flow the commonly accepted principles of war: distinction, 78military necessity,'

5

6

7

8

While this essay focuses on the Department of Defense, it is recognized that there are other
lawyers, particularly in the intelligence services, the Department of State, and the Department
ofJustice, who are also important contributors to the nation's conduct of warfare. Moreover,
there are legal advisors at any number of non-governmental organizations whose work
shapes debates about international law. None of these lawyers, however, directly support use
of force decisions.
Although this essay discusses the lawyer's role in war, it should be recognized that OPLAW
attorneys provide support to the commander's preparation, training, exercises, and planning
before the war; indeed, much of the work of a commander is intended to prevent the
outbreak of war.
For a description of many, but not all, such international instruments, see Levie, The Laws of
War and Neutrality (cited in note 1).
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art XXII (1907),
36 Stat 2277 (hereinafter Hague Convention IV).
The principle of distinction "requires that combatants be distinguished from noncombatants, and that military objectives be distinguished from [civilian property]. Parties to a
conflict shall direct their operations only against combatants and military objectives." Both
sides to a conflict have the obligation to respect this principle and, thus, it is a violation of
this principle of war to use human shields to "guard" a valid military objective. Capt. Jeanne
M. Meyer and Cdr. Brian J. Bill, eds, OperationalLaw Handbook 10 (Center for Military Law
and Operations and International Law Division, Judge Advocate General's School, United
States Army 2002).
Military necessity posits that "a belligerent has the right to apply any measures which are
required to bring about the successful conclusion of a military operation and which are not
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proportionality,9 and avoidance of unnecessary suffering or inhumanity.'0 Today,
any debate about the LOW relates to its overall scope or application in particular
conflicts. The importance and widespread nature of these principles has been
demonstrated by the international debates engendered by the 1998 conflict
surrounding Kosovo, the global war on terrorism, and, most recently, the war in
Iraq.
The expansion of humanitarian law, the international commitment to
enforce the law of war, the pressure to minimize civilian casualties in military
operations, the effect of domestic law on military operations, and the flow of
information and images from battlefields to every corner of the world have
inevitably increased the role and importance of legal advisors in war. Indeed, the
commander, knowing that the way he or she fights and the consequences of
such decisions are subject to public scrutiny, looks to the military lawyer to
ensure that the desired use of force is legal. As Brigadier General Charles
Dunlap succinctly puts it, knowing the legal challenges they will face, "savvy
American commanders seldom go to war without their attorneys."" In the end,
"[lawyers] provide harried decision-makers with a critical guarantee of legal
coverage, turning complex issues of morality into technical issues of legality, so
that whatever moral or operational doubts a commander may have, he can at
least be sure he will not face legal consequences."' 2
Today, however, the role of military lawyers has itself come under scrutiny,
with some concerned that legal advisors wield too much influence in the
conduct of military operations. Brigadier General Dunlap captured this point
when, discussing the role of judge advocates in war, he drew upon comments
from Professor Richard Betts 3 regarding the role of lawyers in the Kosovo

9

10

11

12

13

forbidden by the laws of war." Related to the principle of distinction, this principle states that
attacks may be made only against those targets that are valid military objectives. See
Department of Defense Dictionagy of Militay andAssociated Terms at 334 (cited in note 2).
See Meyer and Bill, eds, OperationalLaw Handbook at 9 (cited in note 7). Proportionality posits
that "[t]he anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained."
(emphasis in original).
"Mt is especially forbidden ... (c.) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his
arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion .. .[and] (e.) To
employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." Hague
Convention IV art XXIII (cited in note 6).
Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving HumanitarianValues in 21st
Centuy Conflicts 6 (Nov 2001), available online at <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu
/cchrp/UseofForcePapers.shtml> (visited Oct 8, 2003) (Colonel Dunlap has since been
promoted to Brigadier General and now serves as the Staff Judge Advocate for the Air
Combat Command).
Id, citing Michael Ignatieff, VirtualWar: Kosovo and Beyond 199 (Metropolitan Books 2000).
Richard K. Betts, Compromised Command, 80 Foreign Affairs 126 (July/Aug 2001) (review of
Wesley K. Clark's Waging Modem War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Comba.
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campaign. Professor Betts alleges that lawyers "constrained even the
preparations for decisive combat" and declares:
One of the most striking features of the Kosovo campaign, in fact, was the
remarkably direct role lawyers played in managing combat operations-to a
degree unprecedented in previous wars ....The role played by lawyers in
this war should also be sobering-indeed alarming-for devotees of power
politics who denigrate the impact of law on international conflict ...
NATO's lawyers... became in effect, its tactical commanders.1 4
Professor Betts' general proposition-that lawyers are too influential in
war-making-is not our experience. At the essential level, lawyers are members
of staffs, bringing to the staff process certain skills and competencies. Like all
other staff members, the attorney is subject to staff dynamics and organizational
frameworks. Moreover, the senior officials and uniformed commanders within
the Department of Defense ("DoD" or "the Department") are some of the
most accomplished individuals in government. They are vastly experienced,
demonstrate sound judgment, and are of high intelligence. They are successful
leaders and warfighters who require little, if any, encouragement to make tough
decisions. They make their own decisions based on their own experience and the
information presented to them. The staff attorney" is one among many
assistants to whom the commander may turn for guidance and information to
contribute to the overall facts that he or she must take into account. Even in
situations where legal issues dominate the discussion, the attorney's role is still
that of an advisor. In the end, military lawyers properly placed do not "manage
combat operations" in completing their tasks. Their advice contributes to
operational success throughout the conflict. This is the critical point: military
lawyers advising national leaders and commanders are not decisionmakers. They
are counselors to their commanders.

II. JUDGE ADVOCATES IN THE MILITARY: THE
TRADITIONAL PRACTICE
Judge advocates have been a part of the armed services since the beginning
of the republic 6 and have, over the years, developed a military legal practice
encompassing several core competencies:
14

Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions at 1 (cited in note 11), citing Betts, 80 Foreign Affairs at
129-30 (cited in note 13). For a discussion of the role of lawyers in the Kosovo War, see

Ignatieff, Virtual War (cited in note 12).
15

16

As a member of the commander's personal staff, the attorney is often a trusted member of
the commander's "inner circle" of advisors who provide the commander with counsel on
matters of law and legal policy.
George Washington established The Judge Advocate General Corps of the Army in 1775.
See US Army Judge Advocate General website, available online at <http://jag.goarmy.com/
index03.htm> (visited Oct 8, 2003). "In November 1779 the Congress authorized the
[Naval] Committee to appoint 'advocates' from time to time 'for the purpose of taking care
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Military justice and other personnel disciplinary actions.
* Personnel issues such as promotion of military and civilian
personnel, physical disability adjudications, retirement benefits,
dependent support, and other employee rights under statute or
regulation.
" Legal assistance for sailors, Marines, soldiers, and airmen such as
the execution of wills and powers-of-attorney. This also includes
personal representation in a variety of settings.
* Litigation representing the government in civil claims seeking
damages for wrongs to the US, defending the US in civil courts for
the alleged torts of military personnel, and defending the US in
other civil actions seeking non-monetary redress.
" International law including US obligations under treaties and status
of forces agreements for US armed forces based or located abroad
and implementation of arms control agreements. For the US Navy
judge advocate, the practice of international law includes a focus on
freedom of navigation on, under, and over the world's oceans.
" Administrative law, including review of investigations, DoD
obligations under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy
Act, standards of conduct/ethics for employees, the impact of
federal fiscal or other domestic law/regulation on the operations of
the services, review of legislation before Congress, and the entry
into and enforcement of contracts by the United States.
Administrative law also encompasses questions arising out of civilmilitary relations, including issues related to homeland security and
defense."7
These are the traditional peacetime legal functions of military legal
advisors. When war starts, these legal responsibilities continue. But the onset of
war brings entirely new concerns, for which military lawyers had to develop
additional expertise.
"

III. THE OPERATIONAL LAWYER: DOCTRINE
Prior to Vietnam, the role of military lawyers in wartime was to provide the
same assistance as during peacetime.18 Their role in law of war matters was

of and managing the maritime causes in which the United States are or may be concerned."'
Capt. Jay M. Siegel, Origins of the NayJudge Advocate General's Coops 25 (GPO 1997).
17

Is

Office of the Judge Advocate General (OJAG) OrganizationManual,JAG Instruction 5400.1A, 1-1
(July 6, 1992), available online at <http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/jag/54001a.pdf> (visited Oct
8, 2003).
See Frederic L. Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat. Army Lauyers inMilitary Operations from
Vietnam to Haitivii, 51 (GPO 2001).
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typically limited to the prosecution of war crimes, which was, in effect, an
extension of one of their traditional core missions, the administration of military
justice. Lawyers rarely penetrated operations centers. In Vietnam, however,
individual initiatives of various judge advocates in international law issues,
particularly prisoner of war and war crimes concerns, began to transform the
legal practice in wartime. 9 For example, their efforts led the South Vietnamese
government to accept that the conflict was an international armed conflict to
which the Geneva Conventions applied and to conform the treatment of enemy
prisoners accordingly.2" This led to the creation of prisoner of war ("POW")
camps monitored by the International Committee of the Red Cross and a POW
maintenance regime consistent with international law. 2 ' At the same time, the
war also saw suspected and, in some cases confirmed, LOW violations by
American forces.22
Lessons learned in Vietnam caused the military leadership to recognize that
US compliance with the LOW required training for all members of the armed
forces, and a cadre of persons responsible for that training and monitoring of
compliance with the LOW during military operations. In 1974 the Secretary of
Defense issued a Department of Defense Directive establishing the DoD Law
of War Program ("DODLOW"). 23 The directive created, within the Office of
General Counsel for the Department of Defense, the responsibility to establish
and oversee a department-wide Law of War program. The program's purposes
are to ensure that the armed forces of the United States conduct all military
operations in compliance with the international law of war and to prevent
violations of the laws of war. The directive assigned overall responsibility to
coordinate and monitor LOW training and compliance to lawyers within the
department.
Since 1974, every member of the armed forces has been required to obtain
LOW training. Commanders are required to "[e]nsure that qualified legal
advisers are immediately available at all levels of command to provide advice
about law of war compliance during planning and execution of exercises and

19
20

21
22
23

Id at 3-52.
Id at 11-12.
This significant success would have been even more notable if the enemy had given our
soldiers the same protections.
The most well known incident, of course, was the killing of civilians at the village of My Lai,
Vietnam, in 1968 by members of the US Army.
Department of Defense Directive 5100.77 (Dec 9, 1998), available online at
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/510077.htm>
(visited July 7, 2003)
(non-military domains are no longer able to access this website) (on file with CJIL). The first
iteration of DoD Directive 5100.77 was published on November 5, 1974. It has been
periodically reviewed and revised. Within the Department of Defense, the General Counsel is
responsible for the maintenance of the directive.
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operations.' 24 Equally important, the directive requires that legal advisors review
all operational plans, policies, directives, and rules of engagement ("ROE") to
ensure "their consistency with the law of war obligations of the United States. ' 25
To meet these requirements, lawyers must have the appropriate security
clearance and access to the war plans and rules of engagement. In short, this
puts the lawyer in the command center. The responsibility to ensure compliance
with the laws of war, more than any other responsibility, accounts for the
emergence of the lawyer as an advisor on the conduct of military operations.
Related to LOW training and planning support is LOW enforcement. The
DODLOW program gives legal advisors a primary role in supporting
Department enforcement efforts. Combatant commanders are required to
designate their legal advisors to supervise the administration of that part of the
LOW program "dealing with possible, suspected, or alleged enemy violations of
the law of war."26 These requirements, when supplemented by the implementing
instructions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, make legal advisors the
primary actors in LOW enforcement, both in the investigation effort and the
subsequent prosecution. Consistent with this doctrine, in the event military
commissions are convened with respect to members of al Qaeda, military
lawyers will be key advisors and participants implementing the creation,
development, and eventual conduct of the proceedings.
Law of war compliance requires more than pre-battle participation in the
planning process. During hostilities, planning and staffing for upcoming actions
is continuous. Legal advisors are embedded in all phases of the targeting process,
including the intelligence collection apparatus, where they examine photos and
other information regarding potential targets. In this arena the legal advisor
provides guidance on LOW principles such as military necessity and
proportionality. Other staff planning efforts also require legal review to ensure
that international sovereignty issues are recognized, use-of-force standards are
followed, operations are conducted within the bounds of domestic law, and
international mandates under which US forces might be operating are observed.
The intent of the DODLOW program can be seen in the doctrine
publications known as Joint Publications ("JPs"). 27 Two examples demonstrate
the role of lawyers in US military operations. "[A]ll actions of the joint force...
are accomplished in accordance with international law and the ROE ....
Military commanders, planners, and legal advisors must consider the desired end

24
25
26
27

Id at
Id at
Id at
Joint

5.3.3.
5.7.3.
5.8.3.
Publications can be accessed through the Joint Electronic Library in the Joint Chiefs of

Staff website, available online at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> (visited Oct 5, 2003).
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state, political goals, and legal constraints when making targeting decisions.'"
Similarly, joint doctrine2 9 requires a role for the judge advocate in the targeting
process:
Due to complexity and extent of international law considerations
involved in the joint targeting process, a judge advocate GA) must be
immediately available at all levels of command to provide advice about law
of war compliance during planning and execution of exercises and
operations. Early involvement by the JA will improve the targeting30process
and can prevent possible violations of international or domestic law.

IV. A NEW PRACTICE FOR OPERATIONAL LAWYERS
The DODLOW program changed the role of the military attorney. Early
on, legal advisors had to overcome skepticism about their presence in the
command center and earn the trust of commanders. Once this trust was earned,
legal advisors began to be invited to planning groups, to participate in exercises,
and to attend the commander's briefings. 31 This development of trust and a
place for the attorney was the origin of the "operational lawyer": the attorney
who supports the warfighting commander through expertise in those parts of
international and operational law relevant to accomplishing the military mission
(including the international law on the use of force). OPLAW is that body of:
[d]omestic and international law associated with the planning and execution
of military operations in peacetime or hostilities. It includes, but is not
limited to, Law of War, law related to security assistance, training,
mobilization,
predeployment
preparation,
deployment,
overseas
procurement, the conduct of military combat operations, anti- and counterterrorist activities, status of forces agreements, operations against hostile
32
forces, and civil affairs operations.
During hostilities military legal advisors still perform traditional legal
functions-crimes are prosecuted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
28

29

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Sept 10, 2002), available online at
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new-pubs/jp3_O.pdf> (visited Oct 5, 2003) (emphasis
omitted).
Joint doctrine sets forth military guidance for joint operations. The movement toward joint
operations within the military will ensure that our military will be, in the words of President
Eisenhower, "singly led and prepared to fight as one regardless of service." Ronald H. Cole,
et al, The Chairmanshipof the Joint Chiefs of Staff 14 (GPO 1995). The joint force will continue to
be the key to success in future operations because of its flexibility and responsiveness.

30

31
32

Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting A-6 (Jan 17, 2002), available online at
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new-pubs/jp3-60.pdf> (visited Oct 8, 2003).
Interview with Capt. Jane Dalton, JAGC, USN (Jan 24, 2003). Captain Dalton was Legal
Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Lt. Col. David E. Graham, OperationalLaw-A Concept Comes of Age, Army Law 9, 10 (July
1987). See also US Army Field Manual 27-100, Legal Support to Operations 3.2 (Mar 1, 2000),
available online at <http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/27-10/toc.htm>
(visited Oct 8, 2003).
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powers-of-attorney are drafted (legal assistance), equipment and services are
purchased (fiscal and contract), and investigations into accidents are conducted
(administrative law). However, it is the laws of war, such as rules for targeting,
rules of engagement, international law in addition to LOW, domestic law
limitations, and war crimes, that distinguish the OPLAW practice.33
To provide the required support, the judge advocate participates in the
commander's (and staff's) decisionmaking processes by performing mission
analysis; preparing analysis of the potential legal issues (legal estimates);
communicating and consulting with lawyers up and down the chain of
command; providing training to the commander, the staff, and subordinate
commanders/units/judge advocates; participating in war games; writing legal
annexes to plans; assisting in the development and training of ROE;
participating in the targeting process; and reviewing plans and orders. The ability
to develop the situational awareness gained by these duties (attendance at
meetings, study of staff products, and presence within the operations arena) is
among the most important skills the judge advocate must master.
Legal advisors whose portfolio includes international and operational law
issues are found at all levels of command. Of course, within different
organizations the staffs are organized differently and have different missions.
The number and skill sets of assigned attorneys will reflect those differences.
Thus, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense ("OSD") has an extensive
staff of legal advisors (almost all civilian), providing counsel on all matters under
the Secretary's cognizance, a combatant commander will have approximately six
to eight legal advisors (almost all uniformed) to handle the legal issuesincluding OPLAW-relevant to such a staff. The common feature to all is that
they provide legal and, when asked, policy counsel to a commander or other
official.
The Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ("CJCS") is
an 0-6 military officer (Navy Captain or Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps
Colonel) selected by the CJCS from among military service nominations. Eight
attorneys, representing each of the services, comprise the staff of the legal office.
The legal office carries its own substantive legal portfolio in many of the areas
mentioned above, though one of the most important is providing OPLAW
advice to the 1,400 members of the Joint Staff. Just as important, however, is the
Legal Counsel's role as the legal spokesperson or liaison for the Combatant
Commander Staff Judge Advocates in interdepartmental and interagency
discussions with the DoD General Counsel, Office of Legal Advisor,

33

In Iraq, judge advocates are "sorting out Iraqi prisoners" to identify captured persons as non-

combatants, lawful combatants, or unlawful combatants. Toni Locy, Military Lanyers Begin
Sorting Out Iraqi Prisoners, Deiding Their Fates, USA Today A5 (Apr 10, 2003). Known as
Article V tribunals, these hearings are a traditional attorney responsibility.
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Department of State, Department of Justice, and lawyers at the National Security
Council.
OPLAW legal advisors are also found in the armed forces of countries
around the world. Like the US, several countries include judge advocates on the
staffs of their commanders.34 The US organization is similar to that found in
British and Australian commands.35 Canada and France, among others, also
deploy judge advocates to the field. Many other countries dedicate legal advisors
to their forces, albeit from a greater distance. This network of lawyers helps
bridge the gaps between individual national interests and the interests of the
coalition by working to clarify ROE and other use of force issues so that
commanders at all levels are aware of the capabilities of all the available forces.

A. WAR IN Kosovo
As discussed above, the need for operational international law advice arises
in many contexts, including the formulation and drafting of rules of engagement,
implementation of the law of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions,
targeting, use of force in domestic situations, arms control, and the law of the
sea. CJCS, members of the Joint Staff, and other operational commanders value
and rely in particular on such legal advice because military lawyers know and
understand them, their weapons systems and operational capabilities, and, most
importantly, their mission. In addition, much of life, including the conduct of
armed conflict, has become more complex and interwoven with the law. All one
has to do is recall the headlines from the recent conflict with Iraq and the almost
daily discussion by US officials and allies concerning the legal (as well as
operational, political, and moral) imperative to avoid injury or death to innocent
civilians and the destruction of civilian property. Also, difficult issues concerning
accountability for Iraqi war crimes and Iraq's violation of the law of war in using
false flags of surrender, clothing military personnel in civilian dress while firing
on coalition forces, launching attacks from protected places (such as hospitals,
schools, and mosques), and the mistreatment of American prisoners of war
greatly increased the need for legal analysis and advice.
Recalling the criticism of some of the military lawyer involvement in the
Kosovo conflict, it is instructive to focus on one prominent aspect of that
operation: targeting. The targeting process is a complex one involving many
participants (operational, intelligence, and judge advocate) at virtually every level
of the chain of command. There are, however, three key levels of
34
35

Interview with Capt. Shelley Young, JAGC, USN Oan 18, 2003). Captain Young was the
Staff Judge Advocate to the United States Central Command.
In absolute numbers, the US fields more legal advisors. There is, however, little difference in
the LOW responsibilities, and no difference in the expertise, of the legal advisors from
coalition partners.
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decisionmaking: the President and the Secretary of Defense; the operational
military commanders and their subordinates responsible for prosecuting the war;
and the pilots in the cockpit, soldiers on the ground, and sailors at sea that
employ the weapons used in war.36 Military lawyers provide legal advice at each
of these levels but so too do many other advisors and staff members.
During the Kosovo conflict the target nomination process began in the
theater of operations at the US European Command ("EUCOM") as a joint
effort undertaken by operations and intelligence personnel. NATO planners also
were involved at various levels. Operational and intelligence planners developed
and recommended targets based on a variety of factors, including the individual
and cumulative effects on the enemy's war-making and war-sustaining capability
and whether those effects ultimately would contribute to the commander's
mission objectives. At the early stages of target planning, military lawyers played
an important role in helping to inform the determination of what were, or were
not, lawful targets. Lawyers in EUCOM and throughout the chain of command
looked to the relevant sources of international law, including treaty law and
customary international law, in preparing their advice to commanders.
Numerous treaty provisions were specifically relevant: for example, the Geneva
Convention provisions on protected persons and places37 and Hague
Convention provisions on the means and methods of warfare.38
Most targets were reviewed and approved in theater, though some were
forwarded to the Pentagon for review. Those that were reviewed and approved
in theater included targets that were plainly military targets; for example, military
equipment and forces, military infrastructure, air defense facilities, and various
command, control, and communication nodes. Targets that were "dual-use"
(infrastructure that served military as well as civilian purposes, such as bridges
and certain industrial targets) or targets that had the potential for significant
civilian casualties were forwarded to the Pentagon. In the Pentagon a team
comprised of operations, intelligence, and judge advocate personnel reviewed
the targets. Many factors went into the evaluation of each target, including: the
military necessity for striking the target; the military advantage or benefit of
striking the target balanced against the assessed potential for-death or injury to
innocent civilians or damage to civilian property; and the risk posed by

36

37

38

Obviously there are many others-intelligence, communications, and logistics personnelbut for purposes of this discussion these three are of primary importance.
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field (1949), 6 UST 3114 (1950); Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (1949),
6 UST 3316 (1950); Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), 6
UST 3316 (1950); Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(1949), 6 UST 3516 (1950).
Hague Convention IV (cited in note 6).
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"outliers" (a weapon that for mechanical or other reasons might not strike its
intended target) if a target was in proximity to a civilian or protected place or
object-for example, a hospital or school.
Each target was assessed carefully against these and other factors.
Occasionally, the chain of command was asked to provide more information
about a particular target or more detailed analysis was sought regarding possible
collateral damage. Once the Pentagon team completed its review, the CJCS was
briefed on the target and associated analysis and, if satisfied with the analysis,
carried the recommended target to the Secretary of Defense and the President
for their review and approval. Despite some of the post-war commentary, the
CJCS recommended disapproval of very few targets, but sometimes did request
more information when it was felt that such information would aid the Secretary
of Defense or the President in their decisionmaking. Some proposed targets
raised difficult issues (for example, several potential targets were of historical or
cultural significance), but throughout the conflict, commanders, working closely
with their operations, intelligence, and judge advocate personnel, achieved their
strategic and operational objectives, consistent with the law of war.
B. WAR ON TERRORISM
If Kosovo represented a traditional military action, the international law of
war paradigm has been challenged by the appearance of organized, worldwide
terrorist networks and the sometimes-associated threat of weapons of mass
destruction. This development has enhanced the role of the attorney.
Responding to the threat of terrorism has required an evolving understanding of
the scope of the LOW. Legal advisors have grappled with issues such as the
status of the terrorists (civilians or soldiers, lawful or unlawful combatants);
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to this sort of conflict and to those
captured; the rights of a state to enter another state to seek and kill ostensibly
private persons within it; the rights of a nation fighting an enemy dispersed into
small bands of individual cells scattered among the civilian population; and the
application of the principles of proportionality and military necessity in attacking
these small cells, or even individual actors who are capable of great destruction
and who hide among the civilian population. On the sea, searches of foreignflagged vessels in an exercise of a nation's own self-defense raise challenging
issues. These questions and issues have tested legal advisors counseling the
Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, the other members of the JCS, and operational
commanders. These lawyers, both civilian and uniformed, have built the legal
framework within which the war is fought. It is their job to advise their clients
on the sound legal bases for military operations against the terrorist networks.
But in some circumstances, the traditional LOW (or domestic law) has not
provided a clear set of rules to follow, and lawyers have had to "think outside
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the box" in support of the war effort. These legal analyses and conclusions
contribute directly to national security by providing the leadership with the legal
tools to plan the nation's response to the aggression. This legal "preparation of
the battlefield" is critical to legitimacy and credibility in the international arena.
This is important, moreover, because these legal conclusions, when turned into
policy by decisionmakers, are evidence of state practice and may, over time,
become international law. Legal advisors throughout DoD are very cognizant of
the fact that their advice is contributing to state practice in fighting the scourge
of terrorism.
Perhaps the clearest example of this new legal framework and state practice
is the determination that the al Qaeda detainees are not prisoners of war as
defined in the Geneva Conventions.3 9 The Red Cross is willing to agree that al
Qaeda personnel are not automatically covered by the terms of the Third
Convention. 4 This emerging state practice is important to ensuring that
countries have adequate measures for detaining terrorists who threaten their
population or territory while maintaining the distinction between civilian and
combatant that the LOW has painstakingly developed.
Another example is the issue of maritime interception. If terrorists use
civilian merchant vessels, flagged in various nations, to transport themselves,
their equipment, or weapons of mass destruction, is it sound national practice to
allow them to use the power of someone else's flag to evade capture or
destruction? No, but the rights of the flag state are important in the law of the
sea. Legal analysis of the rights of a belligerent and self-defense is crucial to the
formation of an acceptable maritime interception policy currently being
developed with other nations.
What is important to note about these examples and other decisions
regarding the war on terrorism are the implications for international law.
Coalition acceptance of these interpretations is evidence that they represent
permissible actions under international law. Indeed, lawyers within the US
understand that the legal framework they have developed for the war on
terrorism is creating state practice. Ultimately, today's legal analyses and policy
determinations about the terrorists shape the battlefield for tomorrow's battles
against them.
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There is clearly legal authority for denying the detainees status as prisoners of war.
The Red Cross believes that the legal status of each of the detainees needs to be determined
on an individual basis. However, it acknowledges that the United States has the absolute right
to legally prosecute any detainee suspected of having committed war crimes or any other
criminal offense. International Committee of the Red Cross, Guantanano Bay: The Work
Continues, (July 18, 2003), available online at <http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/
iwpList454/5C867C1D85AA2BE541256C94006000EE> (visited Oct 8, 2003).
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V. CONCLUSION

The role of the military lawyer in war has clearly expanded in the last
generation, but their underlying role has not changed-military lawyers are
advisors. The OPLAW lawyer provides a legal framework for the conduct of
military operations. That lawyer is, by regulation, a participant in the planning
and execution of military operations. Legal advisors are primary players in the
investigation and prosecution of potential war crimes. Similarly, legal advisors
have a central role in ensuring that the LOW is taught to all personnel. Bringing
this expertise to commanders and the rest of the armed forces has heightened
awareness of the basic principles and specific provisions of international law
underlying the military profession. Moreover, the challenges posed by the war
on terrorism have increased the importance of understanding international law, a
task in which the legal advisor has an important role. The increased involvement
of lawyers is a good thing. US adherence to the LOW, through the training of its
forces and consideration of the LOW during planning and execution, establishes
a baseline for others to emulate.
Many countries around the world share the US commitment to compliance
with the LOW and many of them utilize legal advisors, both at headquarters and
in the field, in ways similar to the US approach. The legal advisors brought to
the coalition headquarters are, like their US counterparts, experienced,
knowledgeable, and operationally savvy.
The participation of military lawyers in the world of warfare has influenced
the choice of means and methods of warfare by putting the principles of the
LOW into the planning process. That is the general intent of the DODLOW
program-to bring the legal advisor's international law and LOW expertise to
bear in planning the use of military force. The fact that the legal advisor brings
the principles of war to the planning cell, or the targeting board, is an important
part of the US commitment to comply with the LOW.
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